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I. INTRODUCTION 
Established in 1935 to administer the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA),1 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is an independent agency 
entrusted with conducting union elections and investigating and remedying any 
unfair labor practices by unions and employers. Once the NLRB’s Regional 
Director issues a complaint of unfair labor practices, an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) holds a hearing that resembles a trial, where the NLRB’s General Counsel 
prosecutes the complaint and the accused party defends its actions. During the 
fact-finding phase, the parties can bolster their arguments with evidence, 
witnesses, and experts.2 
The ALJ’s initial decision is subject to review. Before the case may reach the 
Court of Appeals and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court, the parties must take the 
case to the Board, an arm of the NLRB usually composed of five members 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In general, the Board 
will adopt the ALJ’s factual findings. However, when considering a significant or 
potentially precedential proceeding, the Board may supplement the record by 
“invit[ing] briefs from any interested parties to gather an array of viewpoints and 
experiences.”3 
In the 1930s, the Board’s original membership was almost exclusively 
composed of nonpartisan government employees and academics.4 Further, the 
NLRB’s employees included a Division of Economic Research (DER), a staff of 
economists that developed policy analyses to assist the Board in deciding labor 
disputes.5 By relying on social science statistics from both the economists from 
the DER and an assortment of parties, agencies, and academics from outside the 
division, this early Board enriched its understanding of complex labor questions, 
established a practice of considering diverse perspectives, and acknowledged the 
importance of rigorously assessing the socioeconomic impact of labor policy. 
Over the years, the agency’s ability to evaluate data has eroded drastically. In 
1939, a congressional committee confiscated the DER’s economic files and 
branded the Board’s Chief Economist a Communist; in 1940, Congress summarily 
banned the NLRB from employing economic experts.6 Since the 1950s, presidents 
 
1. NAT’L LABOR REL. BD., BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 33 
(1997). 
2. What We Do: Decide Cases, NAT’L LABOR REL. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do 
/decide-cases (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). 
3. Id. 
4. Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 61 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1361, 1367 (2000). While the reader might conceptualize the DER as a board within a Board, 
I will only refer to the NLRB’s appellate panel as the capital-B “Board.” 
5. Robin Stryker, Limits on Technocratization of the Law: The Elimination of the National Labor 
Relations Board’s Division of Economic Research, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 341, 344 (1989). 
6. 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010–2011) (stating that “[n]othing in this subchapter 
shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals . . . for economic analysis”). 
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have politicized the Board’s nomination process7 by proposing mostly attorneys 
with connections to labor or management8 and with virtually no social science 
training or experience.9 Accordingly, the NLRB now employs neither economic 
nor social science experts to research labor realities,10 and fails to enjoy 
independent access to social science studies.11 
Thus, in order to set the national labor policy, the Board is forced to rely on 
appellate-level party and amicus case briefs for social science evidence.12 The 
absence of scientific support undermines the accuracy and legitimacy of difficult 
NLRB decisions. For example, in Dana Corp. (Dana II ) 13 and several related cases, 
the Board twice reversed its decision on whether unions’ reliance on card check 
campaigns would violate the NLRA by interfering with free employee choice on 
union representation issues. By citing just three NLRB sources of social science 
statistics on employee decision making14 and failing to examine new evidence to 
justify the reversal, the Board exposed itself to accusations of erroneousness and 
politicization. 
In this Note, I argue that in order to recall the era of scientifically supported 
adjudications, Congress should accommodate the NLRB’s unique needs by 
authorizing an economic research unit to generate policy analyses, and by 
approving a cross-disciplinary Board to evaluate these analyses. By expanding the 
pool of Board members to include lawyers and social scientists, Congress may 
succeed in cultivating a spirit of cooperation across specializations while utilizing 
the members’ combined expertise in legal rights issues and social science statistics. 
In turn, this will empower the Board to promulgate more rational, less volatile 
labor policy. 
In Part II, I examine the NLRB’s reliance on amicus briefs for expert 
evidence. Part II explains the means of gathering evidence in Board adjudications, 
the rules for applying evidence in administrative agencies, and standards for 
evaluating evidence under Daubert precedent. In Part III and Part IV, I evaluate 
the Board’s decision making before and after the DER was disbanded through a 
brief case study of the card recognition cases. After defining a card recognition 
campaign and detailing the recognition-bar challenge, Part IV discusses the use of 
social science statistics and critiques the quality and quantity of data in three recent 
 
7. Flynn, supra note 4, at 1392. 
8. Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems 
with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2019 (2009). 
9. James A. Gross, Economics, Politics, and the Law: The NLRB’s Division of Economic Research, 
1935–1940, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 321, 347 (1970). 
10. Stryker, supra note 5, at 344.  
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Dana Corp. (Dana II ) , 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007). 
14. These sources were a former chairman, an operation summary, and an annual report. See 
id. at 439; id. at 439 n.25; id. at 440 n.26. 
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card recognition cases. Finally, in Part V and Part VI, I describe my proposal and 
conclusion on restoring the accuracy and legitimacy of the Board by incorporating 
scientific evidence into its adjudications. 
II. THE NLRB’S RELIANCE ON AMICUS BRIEFS FOR EXPERT EVIDENCE 
A. Evidence Gathering in NLRB Adjudications 
Unlike other federal regulatory agencies, the Board creates policy by deciding 
disputes, not writing regulations.15 Because the Board no longer employs any 
experts to research labor realities16 or enjoys independent access to social science 
studies,17 it must rely on appellate-level party and amicus case briefs for social 
science evidence to inform its conclusions on weighty national issues.18 
Without the expertise to evaluate data independently, Board members could 
theoretically delegate the task of gathering and testing this evidence to the fact-
finding phase of the ALJ proceeding, relying on the parties to subject it to 
rebuttal, counterevidence, and cross-examination. However, the ALJ-level option 
is ill-suited to meeting the Board members’ need for expensive economic 
evidence. 
During NLRB decisions, ALJs behave like trial courts enforcing the Board’s 
policies, while members behave like appellate courts evaluating its precedent. 
Once the parties file appeals, the Board can choose to revisit the policies or merely 
to review the parties’ appeals.19 Thus, when prosecuting multiple cases that 
involve similar issues, the General Counsel cannot predict which case will become 
the vehicle for reexamining the regulations. Considering the cost of generating 
specialized evidence, the General Counsel lacks the resources to incorporate 
statistics assessing the NLRB’s existing policy into every labor case. 
Instead of relying on trials, the Board has bridged the gap by admitting 
appellate briefs as social science evidence. Given the members’ special 
qualifications on thorny legal issues, most analysts agree that “greater laxity may be 
permitted in a court which adjudicates both on the law and on the fact,”20 
allowing the Board to admit expert input without observing the formalistic 
procedural requirements of rules of evidence, including the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (FRE).21 Accordingly, the Board can rely on evidence “of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
 
15. Myron Roomkin & Roger L. Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation: A 
Proposal, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1441, 1462–63 n.89 (1977).  
16. See Stryker, supra note 5, at 344.  
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See NAT’L LABOR. REL. BD., supra note 1, at 35–36. 
20. 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 911 (5th ed. 2010). 
21. Id. at 912.  
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inferences upon the subject,”22 even if the evidence would be inadmissible in a 
federal court case under the FRE.23 
Because the absence of clear-cut rules can raise the risk of arbitrariness or 
bias, this discretionary standard increases the importance of assessing when and 
how the NLRB engages evidence. In Dana II, the Board admitted four party 
briefs, twenty-four amicus briefs, and four reply briefs, but cited three sources of 
social science statistics, all from within the NLRB;24 in Dana III, the Board 
admitted three party briefs, fourteen amicus briefs, and two reply briefs, but cited 
no social science statistics.25 While some imagine the NLRB encounters a “gaping 
hole” in relevant research,26 the admission/citation imbalance may challenge this 
conjecture and create an inference that when the Board members lack the 
expertise to evaluate scientific evidence, increasing the amount of evidence is 
unlikely to increase its utility. 
Recognizing the disadvantages of relying on amici, certain scholars suggest 
that Congress should authorize a social science unit that evokes the Board’s “early 
days.”27 However, the NLRB is different from similar agencies that employ 
economists for specialized analysis. First, Congress’s standard criteria for qualified 
Board members have evolved to limit the ability of academics without industrial 
workplace experience to influence national policy. Second, the Board’s 
adjudicatory body only requires economic research on specific appellate issues, not 
general policy inquiries. Third, the Board receives a substantial quantity of expert 
evidence from amicus briefs, not internal sources. Thus, I argue that assuming 
Congress authorizes a social science unit, it should maximize the Board members’ 
odds of applying science properly by expanding the pool of members to include 
social scientists. 
B. Evidentiary Rules for Administrative Agencies 
Given federal agencies’ great discretion on many evidentiary matters, it is 
essential that adjudicators have the expertise to evaluate scientific evidence. Under 
 
22. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
23. PIERCE, supra note 20, at 912. 
24. Dana Corp. (Dana II ) , 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007). For a list of links to all briefs in Dana II, 
see Case 08-RD-001976, NAT’L LABOR REL. BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-RD-001976 (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2011) (discussed in detail in infra Part IV). While the website lists twenty-five amicus 
briefs, this appears to be an error because the Brief of International Union, United Automobile, 
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and Amicus American 
Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations is listed twice. 
25. Dana Corp. (Dana III ) , 356 N.L.R.B. 49 (2010). For a list of links to all briefs in Dana III, 
which are listed under Lamons Gasket Co. because the original employer withdrew its request for 
review, see Lamons Gasket Co. Invitation to File Briefs, NAT’L LABOR REL. BD., http://www.nlrb.gov 
/node/384 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (discussed in detail in infra Part IV). 
26. Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, NLRB Elections Versus Card Check Campaigns: Results of a 
Worker Survey, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 157, 160 (2009). 
27. Roomkin & Abrams, supra note 15, at 1459–60 n.79. 
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the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies are not subject to the FRE.28 Instead, 
the ALJ may receive “[a]ny oral or documentary evidence . . . , but the agency as a 
matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious evidence.”29 Indeed, the NLRB’s rules require the Board to obey the 
FRE only “so far as practicable.”30 
To justify this distinction, analysts observe that evidentiary rules for judicial 
trials are designed with juries in mind. Accordingly, these evidentiary rules assume 
that triers of fact are: (1) separate from judges who adjudicate the issue of 
admissibility, (2) lacking in knowledge on legal psychology or technical reliability, 
(3) susceptible to error in assessing probative value, (4) inclined to emotionality, 
and (5) hence restrainable only by restricted exposure to prejudicial evidence.31 
By contrast, agencies entrust fact-finding to professionals, not laypeople.32 
(For example, the NLRB employs mostly labor lawyers as Board members.33) 
Considering their “specialized expertise in the subject matter,” they do not share 
the aforementioned five characteristics of juries: separation of responsibility, 
inexperience on topic, susceptibility to error, inclination toward emotionality, and 
restraint through lack of exposure. Consequently, they are trusted to examine the 
evidence without strong FRE safeguards against misuse.34 
Because an agency adjudicator “is equally exposed to evidence whether he 
admits it or excludes it,” reviewing courts reason that rigorous exclusionary rules 
for agency proceedings make little sense.35 Given the adjudicator’s presumptive 
competence to disregard or discount the information found inadmissible or 
inapplicable, courts see little harm in letting agencies receive disputed evidence. By 
contrast, they discern great danger in eliminating “that which is competent and 
relevant by mechanistic application” of exclusionary rules.36 
Accordingly, courts advocate a highly “critical view of exclusionary rulings by 
administrative agencies”37 and admonish that exclusions “may well result” in due 
process reversals.38 Simply put, they “strongly advise administrative law judges: if 
in doubt, let it in.”39 By effectively eliminating the procedural protections against 
admitting incompetent evidence, these cases increase the importance of evaluating 
the evidence—without affording an alternative for agencies that lack the requisite 
 
28. PIERCE, supra note 20, at 909. 
29. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2010). 
30. 29 C.F.R. § 102.39 (2010). 
31. PIERCE, supra note 20, at 910–11. 
32. Id. at 912. 
33. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, at 2019. 
34. PIERCE, supra note 20, at 911. 
35. U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 187 F.3d 384, 388 (4th 
Cir. 1999). 
36. Multi-Med. Convalescent & Nursing Ctr. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir. 1977). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 978. 
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scientific expertise to resolve technical ambiguities. 
C. The Daubert Standard for Evaluating Evidence 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court used the 
assumption of professional adjudicator expertise to establish a highly relaxed 
standard for assessing scientific evidence in the absence of a jury.40 Specifically, 
Daubert cited FRE 703, which permits experts to base their opinion testimony on 
evidence “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,”41 even if that evidence would 
itself be inadmissible. The “spirit of Daubert”42 renders FRE 703 relevant to 
advising administrative agencies.43 
When analyzing the scientific validity of specialized evidence, the Supreme 
Court admonished trial courts to assess two factors: reliability and relevance.44 To 
do so, the Supreme Court envisioned a “flexible” inquiry45 and identified five 
generally relevant issues: (1) Can (and has) the theory or technique been tested? (2) 
Has it been subjected to peer review/publication? (3) What is the known or 
potential error rate? (4) Does it have standards of operation? How are they being 
maintained? and (5) Does it enjoy “general acceptance”?46 
Applying these principles to current NLRB cases may pose two problems. 
First, vigorous cross-examination and strong counterevidence “are the traditional 
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”47 However, 
evidence introduced in amicus briefs is never subject to cross-examination. 
Additionally, briefs filed last or simultaneously are unlikely to receive a response. 
As a result, amicus briefs can always avoid cross-examination and often avoid 
rebuttal. 
Second, Daubert requires the agency’s evidentiary inquiries to “focus . . . 
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they 
generate.”48 However, critics might infer that Board members lacking the expertise 
to focus on social science principles and methodology have no choice but to focus 
on their conclusions. NLRB “flip-flops” that apparently result from ideological 
voting may challenge the perception of specialized Board expertise and call the 
agency’s perceived legitimacy into question.49 
 
 40.    Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
41. Id. at 597. 
42. PIERCE, supra note 20, at 912.  
43. Id.  
44. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
45. Id. at 594. 
46. Id. at 593–94. 
47. Id. at 596. 
48. Id. at 595. 
49. Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 707, 760 (2006). 
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Considering the complexity of the NLRA and the sophistication of the 
NLRB’s policy problems, the Board has encountered an array of occasions for 
social science statistics. However, without a social science staff, the NLRB often 
relies on agency experience, not scientific evidence. When the Board does attempt 
to incorporate specialized input, it finds itself “poorly equipped to evaluate it.”50 
Thus, the NLRB has filled the gap by relying on data from party/amicus briefs. 
In relying on amici, the agency encounters two important critiques. 
Proponents of social science scholarship are wary of basing NLRB decisions on 
“untested suppositions” about human behavior.51 Instead, they urge the Board to 
use “the best available data”52 to conduct empirical studies, and employ expert 
theory and research to assess the assumptions of cause and effect in regulated 
labor processes.53 This way the NLRB could determine the impact of potential 
workplace policies,54 especially in areas that exceed the Board members’ 
experiences. 
Second, opponents of amici are skeptical of NLRB decisions relying on 
briefs that implicate factual issues. Since the Board usually solicits amicus briefs on 
appeal, they possess the potential to derail a litigation. Because amicus briefs can 
introduce factual information without obeying the rules of evidence or receiving 
vigorous cross-examination, the NLRB cannot rely on parties’ adverse interests to 
keep them honest. Instead, it must evaluate evidence independently—a challenge 
for lay Board members in hypertechnical cases. 
III. DECIONMAKING UNDER DER 
In the 1930s, the Board’s original membership was almost exclusively 
composed of nonpartisan government employees and academics.55 Further, the 
NLRB’s employees included a Division of Economic Research (DER), a staff of 
economists that developed policy analyses to assist the Board in deciding labor 
disputes.56 By relying on social science statistics from both the economists from 
the DER and an assortment of parties, agencies, and academics from outside the 
division, this early Board enriched its understanding of complex labor questions, 
established a practice of considering diverse perspectives, and acknowledged the 
importance of rigorously assessing the socioeconomic impact of labor policy. 
To aid the Board in producing good policy, DER economists performed 
independent research and wrote detailed reports that provided an economic-
 
50. Stryker, supra note 5, at 344. 
51. JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 265 
(1981). 
52. Derek C. Bok, Foreword to JULIUS G. GETMAN, ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION 
ELECTIONS xi, xii (1976). 
53. Stryker, supra note 5, at 344. 
54. Gross, supra note 9, at 345. 
55. Flynn, supra note 4, at 1367. 
56. Stryker, supra note 5, at 344. 
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history explanation for pressing labor problems. After the NLRB’s General 
Counsel had introduced these reports into evidence, they appeared in opinions 
from NLRB Board members and reviewing appellate justices, often without 
opposition.57 When parties did object to general DER statistics, they argued the 
data was immaterial, unverified hearsay “of no evidentiary value.”58 Rejecting this 
reasoning, the Eighth Circuit noted the well-settled “propriety of introducing in 
evidence economic data . . . obtained from governmental or other authoritative 
sources.”59 
For example, in NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., the General Counsel charged a 
bituminous coal company with discharging two employees for joining a union, 
thereby affecting interstate commerce and violating NLRA § 8(1).60 When the 
company denied operating a business that affected interstate commerce, the 
opinion cited a DER bulletin entitled The Effect of Labor Relations in the Bituminous 
Coal Industry upon Interstate Commerce, which specifically stated that “production is 
customarily not undertaken until orders are received and a supply of cars [for 
interstate coal shipments is] assured.”61 
Likewise, in H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, the General Counsel charged an 
employer that reached a unionized workplace agreement but declined to sign a 
contract with refusing to bargain in violation of sections 8(1) and 8(5) of the 
NLRA.62 To explain why failure to sign a contract necessarily violated the duty to 
bargain and undercut the NLRA’s express aims, the opinion cited a DER bulletin 
entitled Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining, which itemized the growth 
and extent of signed trade agreements and inferred they serve “both as recognition 
of the union with which the agreement is reached and as a permanent memorial of 
its terms.”63 
In addition to citing DER studies, NLRB Board members and reviewing 
appellate justices also enriched their analyses by supporting substantive statements 
with non-DER sources. In Crowe, the opinion demonstrated the respondent’s 
effect on interstate commerce by citing the parties’ agreed statement of facts, 
which described the transactions for one representative year. The statement’s 
 
57. See, e.g., H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 61 S. Ct. 320, 323 (1941) (citation to DER by Board); 
Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n, 300 U.S. 515, 545 n.4 (1937) (citation to DER by National Mediation 
Board, which covers workplace disputes under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152). 
58. NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., 104 F.2d 633, 634 (8th Cir. 1939). 
59. Id. at 634 n.1 (citing NLRB v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 267 n.2 (1938); NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 n.8 (1937); Virginian, 300 U.S. at 545–46 nn.4–5).  
60. Id. at 633. 
61. Id. at 635 (citing Dep’t of Econ. Research, NLRB, BULL. NO. 2 (1938)). 
62. Heinz, 61 S. Ct. at 323. 
63. Id. at 324 n.1. The footnote reads, in part: “Concerning the growth and extent of signed 
trade agreements, see National Labor Relations Board, Division of Economic Research Bull. No. 4, 
Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining, pp. 213–236, 49–209; U.S. Dept. of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Five Years of Collective Bargaining, pp. 5–7; Saposs and Gamm, Rapid 
Increase in Contracts, 4 Labor Relations Reporter No. 15, p. 6.” Id. 
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statistics showed, for example, that 98,583.32 tons of respondent’s coal (or 36.8 
percent of total production) had entered interstate commerce or been used to 
enable interstate commerce to function.64 
Similarly, the Heinz opinion used agency statistics and scholarly studies to 
illustrate the importance of written agreements to peaceful workplaces. 
Specifically, sources showed that: (1) the number of signed trade contracts had 
grown over time,65 (2) written contracts served as a recognition of the union and a 
record of the terms,66 (3) employers often declined to sign written contracts in 
order to frustrate the process of bargaining,67 and (4) unlike unilateral policies, 
signed labor contracts were considered “effective instrument[s] of stabilizing labor 
relations and preventing, through collective bargaining, strikes and industrial 
strife.”68 
By incorporating the DER’s rigorous labor policy research, the 1930s NLRB 
led federal agencies by enriching its understanding of complex labor questions 
with social science evidence. For example, in Virginian Railway Co. v. System 
Federation, the National Mediation Board (NMB) borrowed information from a 
DER bulletin entitled Governmental Protection of Labor’s Right to Organize to justify the 
Railway Labor Act.69 When other agencies adopted the DER’s economic data, 
they implicitly acknowledged its unique expertise on contentious labor questions 
and lent an air of legitimacy to other Board opinions. By contrast, when they 
stopped citing the NLRB’s specialized evidence, they signaled its irrelevance on 
cutting-edge issues. 
Further, the early NLRB established a practice of considering non-DER 
perspectives with strong scientific support. For example, the Board used data to 
show that employer interference with employee unionization often induced labor 
unrest and impaired interstate commerce. In Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 
 
64. NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., 104 F.2d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1939). 
65. Heinz, 61 S. Ct. at 324 n.1. The footnote reads, in part: “Concerning the growth and 
extent of signed trade agreements, see National Labor Relations Board, Division of Economic 
Research Bull. No. 4, Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining, pp. 213–236, 49–209; U.S. 
Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Five Years of Collective Bargaining, pp. 5–7; Saposs and 
Gamm, Rapid Increase in Contracts, 4 Labor Relations Reporter No. 15, p. 6.”  Id. 
66. Id. The footnote reads, in part: “Lewis L. Lorwin, The American Federation of Labor, p. 
309; Commons and Associates, History of Labor in the United States, vol. II, pp. 179–181, 423, 424, 
480; Perlman and Taft History of Labor in the United States, 1806–1932, vol. IV, pp. 9, 10; Paul 
Mooney, Collective Bargaining, pp. 13, 14; Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., Labor and the 
Government, p. 339.” Id. 
67. Id. at 325 n.2. The footnote reads, in part: “Sumner H. Slichter, Annals of the American 
Academy (March, 1935), pp. 110–120; R. R. R. Brooks, When Labor Organizes, p. 224.” Id.  
68. Id. at 325 n.3. The footnote reads: “Carroll R. Daugherty, Labor Problems in American 
Industry (Rev. ed. 1938), pp. 936, 937; Mitchell, Organized Labor, p. 347; George G. Groat, An 
Introduction to the Study of Organized Labor in America, 2d Ed.1926, pp. 337–339, 341, 345, 346; 
First Annual Report, National Mediation Board, pp. 1–2.” Id. 
69. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n, 300 U.S. 515, 545–46 nn.4–5 (1937) (citing Dep’t of Econ. 
Research, NLRB, BULL. NO. 1 (1936)). 
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it cited an eighteen-month Department of Labor (DOL) study that blamed anti-
union activities for eight of fifteen canning-industry work stoppages, which 
affected 7,484 employees.70 In Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, it cited another 
eighteen-month DOL study that blamed anti-union activities for ninety-four 
textile-industry work stoppages affecting 290,154 employees and costing the 
industry 3,958,891 man-days of idleness.71 
Additionally, the 1930s NLRB engaged the evidence by scrutinizing whether 
statistics actually supported the party briefs’ points. Occasionally, the Board 
repurposed one party’s studies to support another party’s statements. For 
example, in NLRB v. National Motor Bearing Co., the Board cited the defendant’s 
data on plant productivity to disprove its claims of declines in production and 
suggest a proscribed motive for partially closing.72 Similarly, in Montgomery Ward & 
Co. v. NLRB, the court cited a company’s data on seasonal hiring to show its 
unjustified departure from standard practice and thus to support the NLRB’s 
inference of anti-union animus for failing to rehire.73 
In 1939, however, a congressional committee confiscated the DER’s 
economic files and branded the Board’s Chief Economist a Communist.74 In 
1940, Congress “unceremoniously” banned the NLRB from employing economic 
experts.75 By attacking the DER’s political ideology (not the unit’s scientific 
methodology), Congress implied that some perspectives are simply forbidden, 
regardless of whether they receive scientific support. Although the specific 
political attack that motivated this ban was discredited and faded from America’s 
political culture, the ban itself persists in affecting NLRB processes. 
Finally, the early NLRB recognized the importance of studying social science 
when setting labor policy. In keeping with the spirit of the NLRA, whose 
proponents feared that partisan appointees were probably partial to specific sides 
and possibly driven by future reemployment with certain interests,76 presidents 
nominated scholars and nonpartisan government workers “nearly exclusively.”77 
When presidents assumed that career academics were uniquely qualified and 
inherently impartial, they implied that social science expertise was integral to 
setting labor policy. However, when presidents abandoned this nomination 
tradition, they intimated that social science expertise was secondary to partisan 
 
70. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 462–63 (1938).  
71. Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 94 F.2d 61, 63 (4th Cir. 1938) (citing to “Board 
Exhibit No. 16, under the title ‘Strikes and lockouts in the Cotton Textile Industry in 1934, and in 
January to July, inclusive, 1935, by Major Issues Involved’”). 
72. NLRB v. Nat’l Motor Bearing Co., 105 F.2d 652, 657–58 (9th Cir. 1939). 
73. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1939). 
74. Stryker, supra note 5, at 350; 25.6 NLRB, RECORDS RELATING TO THE SMITH 
COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION OF THE NLRB (1934–1941). 
75. Stryker, supra note 5, at 344; 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010–2011). 
76. Flynn, supra note 4, at 1368, 1368 n.25. 
77. Id. at 1367. 
Assembled V1I4 4.9.2012 (Do Not Delete) 4/9/2012  10:25 AM 
1268 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:1257 
 
industry experience—an important impediment to achieving legitimacy. 
IV. DECISIONMAKING AFTER DER: AN NLRB CASE STUDY 
A. Card Recognition Campaigns 
The NLRB is currently confronting a high-stakes debate: whether the NLRA 
should protect a union organizing process that excludes an official Board election 
and allows recognition of a union by a majority sign-up process. By conducting a 
brief case study of card recognition cases, I argue that the disbanding of the DER 
and the restaffing of the Board have undermined the accuracy and legitimacy of 
difficult NLRB decisions. First, I define a card recognition campaign and detail the 
recognition-bar challenge. Next, I discuss the use of social science statistics and 
critique the quality and quantity of data in three recent card recognition cases. 
Finally, I describe my proposal and conclusion on restoring the accuracy and 
legitimacy of the Board by incorporating scientific evidence into its adjudications. 
Traditionally, a union would organize a workplace by collecting authorization 
cards from employees who supported union representation. Once the union had 
cards from a third of the workplace’s eligible employees, it would submit these 
cards to the NLRB and request a secret ballot election. If the union won the 
election by majority vote, the employer would have to recognize the union and 
engage in good faith bargaining. In order to give the union a chance to negotiate 
its initial bargaining agreement, the NLRB would apply an unrebuttable 
presumption that the union represented a majority of the employees until the 
expiration of a reasonable waiting period.78 This would protect the winning union 
from rival unions. 
Today, a union that collects valid cards from a majority of the employees at a 
site typically does not request an official NLRB election. Instead, it asks the 
employer for voluntary recognition in the form of a neutrality agreement or “card 
check.” Studies show that more employees support unions during card check 
campaigns than secret ballot elections.79 Accordingly, some employers state that 
ballots best reflect the preferences of employees and argue that unions behave 
coercively during the organizing drives preceding the card check campaigns.80 
Conversely, some unions state that cards best reflect the preferences of employees 
and argue that employers behave coercively between the card check campaigns 
and the secret ballot elections.81 
Both proponents and opponents of card recognition campaigns can cite 
social science that supports their standpoint. On one hand, some studies show 
 
78. Michael E. Aleo, Card Check Recognition: The Ongoing Legal and Legislative Battle 2–3 (bepress 
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that employers opposing unions have considerably more opportunities for 
dissuading their employees from voting for unions and often commit poorly 
remedied unfair labor practices against unions between demand and election.82 
However, other sources suggest that unions gathering cards take advantage of 
workers’ wishes to “avoid offending the person who asks them to sign, often a 
fellow worker, or simply to get the person off their back.”83 Further, employees 
who sign cards might simply change their minds.84 
In other words, the current legal contest over whether or when a union 
should be able to receive recognition with a card recognition majority instead of a 
secret ballot election hinges on several empirical questions, for example: Are cards 
or elections more reliable indicators of employee preferences? Are unions more 
likely to misinform or coerce the employees into submitting cards supporting the 
representation? Or are employers more likely to misinform or coerce the 
employees who submitted cards supporting the representation into voting against 
unionization? 
Although the Board recognizes cards as bases for measuring employee 
support for unionization, it expresses a long-standing preference for secret ballot 
elections.85 However, the labor community continues to debate the question of 
whether this preference is based on sound social science and reflects a practical 
public policy.  Given the evidence that card recognition campaigns are easier for 
unions to organize and harder for employers to stop, the stakes are high for 
industries, employers, and employees. 
B. The Recognition-Bar Challenge 
Recently, the Board was forced to confront these hot topic questions head 
on. In Dana I, an automotive workers’ union successfully conducted a card check 
campaign and convinced the employer to confer voluntary recognition by signing 
a standard neutrality agreement.86 Under the recognition-bar doctrine, a union that 
secures good faith employer support on basis of demonstrated majority status can 
receive a three-year reprieve from official Board elections.87 In Dana I, this 
prevented a rival labor union from seeking to represent the same bargaining unit.88 
In order to defeat the recognition-bar doctrine, the rival union complained 
that the acting union lacked the status of majority bargaining representative and 
could not enter a neutrality agreement on behalf of Dana’s employees. Generally, 
 
82. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1784 (1983). 
83. NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360, 1371 (7th Cir. 1983). 
84. Alliant Foodservice, 335 N.L.R.B. 695, 695 (2001). 
85. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969). 
86. Dana Corp. (Dana I ) , JD-24-05 (NLRB Div. of Judges Apr. 8, 2005). 
87. Aleo, supra note 78, at 2–3. 
88. Dana I , JD-24-05 at 3. 
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the ALJ is charged with enforcing agency policy, while the Board is capable of 
evaluating its desirability.89 Accordingly, the Dana I ALJ used a mere ten pages to 
apply the recognition-bar doctrine and dismiss the complaint.90 Despite the 
quantity and complexity of issues that impact the recognition-bar discussion, the 
ALJ cited no social science statistics and made no mention of whether it 
represented sound policy. 
On appeal from Dana I, the reviewing Board in Dana II reframed the issue 
from descriptive (whether the parties had obeyed the recognition-bar doctrine) to 
normative (whether the doctrine should exist at all). To answer the legal question 
of whether the recognition-bar doctrine is compatible with statute and 
commendable as policy, the Board addressed the factual question of whether card 
check elections are more prone than secret ballot elections to coercion and 
manipulation.91 As a result, the NLRB admitted four party briefs, twenty-four 
amicus briefs, and four reply briefs, many of which emphasized the social science 
evidence and couched their challenges in data analysis terms.92 
Using this evidence, the Board reconsidered the balance between two 
competing interests: protecting employee preference and promoting stable 
bargaining. Upon holding the recognition-bar doctrine to undervalue the 
employees’ statutory right to choose their representation through official NLRB 
elections, the Board lowered the recognition bar and modified the restrictions on 
rival unions’ power to challenge the representativeness of voluntarily recognized 
unions.93 
Three years later, the Board used Rite Aid Store #6473 to solicit amicus briefs 
regarding “the actual experience of employees, unions, and employers under Dana 
[II]”;94 several months later, it reaffirmed the ALJ’s dismissal in Dana I.95 The 
following year, the Board overturned Dana II and reinstated the recognition bar.96 
Considering the number of times the agency has changed its policy in just the last 
six years, this development underscores the need for reliable statistics to justify the 
NLRB’s decisions. 
 
89. See NAT’L LABOR REL. BD., supra note 1, at 35–36. 
90. Dana I , JD-24-05 at 3. 
91. Dana Corp. (Dana II ) , 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 434 (2007). 
92. Id. at 434 n.2; Case 08-RD-001976, NAT’L LABOR REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/case 
/08-rd-001976 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
93. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 434. 
94. Rite Aid Store #6473, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157, 1 (Aug. 27, 2010). 
95. Dana Corp. (Dana III ) ,  356 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (Dec. 6, 2010). 
96. Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. 72 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov 
/link/document.aspx/09031d458060afd7. In Lamons, the Board overruled the substantive conclusion 
of Dana II. As my case study of the Dana decisions only examines the Board’s use of scientific 
evidence without judging its ultimate conclusions, I will not discuss Lamons. 
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C. Dana II’s Amicus Evidence 
1. Citations to Social Science Statistics 
To answer the legal/normative question of whether card recognition 
campaigns should receive NLRA protection, Dana II assessed the 
factual/empirical question of whether card recognition campaigns are inherently 
less reliable than official NLRB elections.97 Despite admitting twenty-four amicus 
briefs that represented a variety of interests,98 the Board relied largely on three 
NLRB sources: a former chairman,99 an operational summary,100 and an annual 
report.101 
First, the Board cited a 1962 presentation by Frank McCulloch, who served 
as chairman from 1961 to 1970102—a source mentioned in “several” Dana II 
briefs103 and other court opinions.104 While Dana II failed to specify McCulloch’s 
strategy for obtaining the statistics he cited, the speech’s transcript suggests that 
McCulloch had examined 202 elections: fifty-eight with recognition rates105 of 
thirty to fifty percent, eighty-seven with fifty to seventy percent, and fifty-seven 
with over seventy percent.106 
The statistics showed a “significant disparity” between card recognition rates 
and official election results: Unions with fifty to seventy percent recognition won 
only forty-eight percent of elections, and unions with over seventy percent 
recognition won only seventy-four percent of elections.107 (For fifty to seventy 
percent recognition, “[t]he study itself gives the figure fifty-two percent, but this is 
evidently an arithmetical error, since the study reports that the union won forty-
two out of eighty-seven elections, which is forty eight percent.”108) 
 
97. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 439. 
98. Dana II lists the amici who oppose the recognition-bar doctrine: (1) twenty-one 
Republican representatives; (2) federal and state chambers of commerce; (3) employer industry 
associations; (4) contract security companies; (5) anti-union advocacy organizations; and (6) 
labor/employment attorneys. 351 N.L.R.B. at 435 n.8. Additionally, Dana II lists the amici who 
support the recognition-bar doctrine: (1) forty-eight Democratic congressmen; (2) companies; (3) 
unions; (4) labor advocacy organizations; and (5) professors. Id. at 436 n.9. 
99. Id. at 439. 
100. Id. at 439 n.25. 
101. Id. at 440 n.26. 
102. Board Members Since 1935, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us 
/overview/board/board_members_since_1935.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2011). 
103. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 439. 
104. See, e.g., NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360, 1371 (7th Cir. 1983); Retail, Wholesale, 
& Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 301, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967); NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 
386 F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Johnnie’s Poultry, 344 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1965); 
Cnty. of Du Page v. Ill. Labor Relations Bd., 231 Ill. 2d 593, 625 (2008). 
105. The percentage of employees who submitted cards supporting the union. 
106. Frank McCulloch, A Tale of Two Cities: Or Law in Action, 1962 PROCEEDINGS OF ABA 
SECTION OF LAB. REL. LAW 14, 17 (1962). 
107. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 439 (citing McCulloch, supra note 106, at 17).  
108. Village IX, 723 F.2d at 1371; accord Du Page, 231 Ill. 2d at 625. 
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Next, the Board cited two NLRB sources. In 2007, the General Counsel 
released an operational summary memorandum for fiscal year 2006, which 
revealed that once the NLRB received an election petition, the median delay was 
thirty-nine days. In fact, 94.2 percent of elections occurred within fifty-six days.109 
The year before, the NLRB gave an annual report for fiscal year 2005, which only 
showed an objection rate110 of five percent.111 
Finally, the Board cited an article by James Brudney, which surveyed several 
dozen social science studies (and even a Dana II brief) on card-recognition issues, 
many published within the last ten years.112 However, it did not utilize Brudney’s 
article to communicate a labor policy argument or convey an expert 
insight/evidence. Instead, it used Brudney simply to supply a list of voluntary-
recognition objectives “that will remain unaffected by our decision today.”113 
2. Use of Social Science Statistics 
Surprisingly, neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion discussed 
whether McCulloch’s statistics constituted good science. That is, neither opinion 
checked the study for compliance with Daubert ’s evidentiary benchmark for 
testing, peer review, error rate, operational standards, and general acceptance. 
Instead, they confined their inquiry to questioning its relevance to determining the 
significance of receiving card recognition. 
Specifically, the majority argued that elections represent an instantaneous 
snapshot of employee preference.114 However, recognition cards are regularly 
collected over protracted periods (e.g., over a year in one union drive), during 
which time “employees can and do change their minds.”115 Because these cards 
merely provide a basis for conducting an election, the reasons for questioning 
their reliability “become moot once an election is held.”116 
By contrast, the dissent insisted the study had “prove[d] nothing” about 
whether cards or elections are more reliable. This is because the disparity could 
“just as easily” have resulted from employer coercion during election campaigns as 
 
109. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 439 n.25 (citing Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, 
Memorandum GC 07-03 Revised, Summary of Operations (Fiscal Year 2006) (2007)). 
110. The percentage of elections in which the losing party filed an objection to the winner’s 
campaign manner and asked the NLRB to invalidate the outcome. 
111. Id. at 440 n.26 (citing 70 NLRB Ann. Rep. 130 (2005)).  
112. Id. at 442 n.34 (citing James Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: 
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 832–41 (2005)). The brief in question is Brief 
for Kaiser Foundation Health Plan as Amicus Curiae, Dana Corp. (Dana II ), 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007) 
(No. 8-RD-1976) (supporting voluntary recognition). See Brudney, supra, at 886 n.54. 
113. Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 442. 
114. Id. at 439. 
115. Id. at n.23 (citing Alliant Foodservice, 335 N.L.R.B. 695, 695 (2001), where sixteen 
employees who signed cards for one union later signed cards for another union). 
116. Id. at n.24 (citing Ne. Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 248 (1975), which states that “it is the 
election, not the showing of interest, which decides” the issue of representation). 
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union coercion during card collections. Depending on who coerced whom, the 
cards (not the votes) may “truly [have] reflected the employees’ free choice.”117 
Similarly, the opinions never questioned the admissibility or reliability of 
internal NLRB evidence and concentrated their arguments on examining its 
applications. Since 94.2 percent of elections occur within three months of the 
filing of the election petition, the majority argued that providing orderly processes 
for gauging electoral fairness may only cause a “substantial delay in a small 
minority” of union drives.118 Because ninety-five percent of elections lack 
objections, the statistics belie suggestions that anti-union employers enjoy “a one-
sided advantage” which allows them to exert pressure on employees throughout 
an election campaign.119 
Without disputing the 94.2 percent figure, the dissent declared the delay 
unacceptable because union status can remain unresolved for three months after 
voluntary recognition and because objections may cause the delay to snowball.120 
Likewise, without disputing the five percent figure, the dissent maintained that 
“[t]o the extent the majority is suggesting that employer coercion is rare in election 
campaigns, the majority’s statistics do not account for situations in which 
employer conduct was not known to the union or in which the union, for 
whatever reason, chose not to file objections.”121 
Finally, the opinions never probed the Brudney survey article for 
admissibility or relevance. Interestingly, Brudney argued that “an array of findings 
and studies indicate that the NLRB elections regime regularly tolerates, 
encourages, and effectively promotes coercive conditions that preclude the 
attainment of employee free choice,”122 which directly challenges the majority 
preference for NLRB elections.123 
Without scrutinizing these studies or engaging these arguments, the majority 
utilized Brudney merely to supply the various reasons for voluntary recognition 
“that will remain unaffected by our decision today.”124 By contrast, the dissent 
used the article to support a substantive factual statement: that “employer anti-
union conduct, and attendant delays, can undermine union support during lengthy 
election campaigns.”125 
 
117. Id. at 448 n.19 (Liebman & Walsh, dissenting in part but concurring in result). 
118. Id. at 439 n.25 (citing Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, Memorandum GC 07-03 
Revised, Summary of Operations (Fiscal Year 2006) (2007)). 
119. Id. at 440 n.26 (citing 70 NLRB Ann. Rep. 130 (2005)). 
120. Id. at 447 n.15 (Liebman & Walsh, dissenting in part but concurring in result). 
121. Id. at 448 n.19 (Liebman & Walsh, dissenting in part but concurring in result). 
122. Brudney, supra note 112, at 819.  
123. See Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 434. 
124. Id. at 442 (citing Brudney, supra note 112, at 832–41). 
125. Id. at 448 n.19 (Liebman & Walsh, dissenting in part but concurring in result) (citing 
Brudney, supra note 112, at 824). 
Assembled V1I4 4.9.2012 (Do Not Delete) 4/9/2012  10:25 AM 
1274 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:1257 
 
D. Rite Aid’s Amicus Evidence 
In Rite Aid, the Board switched gears on card-check campaigns. In granting 
the request to review Dana II ’s modification of recognition-bar protection, Rite 
Aid refrained from reaching the merits or citing any statistics without “giving any 
interested party any opportunity to present any evidence” on whether Dana II was 
working to effectuate the employees’ choices regarding union representation.126 
Thus, it opted to solicit amicus briefs in order to “consider the actual experience 
of employees, unions, and employers under Dana Corp., before arriving at any 
conclusions.”127 
By contrast, the concurrence and dissent both cited the NLRB’s election 
statistics as compiled by its General Counsel. These statistics showed an official 
election rate of five percent and a union rejection rate of one percent. Specifically, 
as of June 1, 2010, the NLRB received some 1,111 notices of voluntary 
recognition and fifty-four petitions for traditional election. The voting employees 
refused the union fifteen times, a number that included two elections that chose a 
petitioning union over the recognized union.128 
Again, neither opinion disputed the General Counsel’s data as inadmissible 
or unreliable. Instead, they disagreed on whether it showed that Dana II was doing 
its job. The concurrence contended that since the rejection rate was just one 
percent, Dana II served no “clear purpose” in ninety-nine percent of total cases.129 
Further, the data had failed to capture those neutrality agreements that were not 
signed as a result of the parties’ concerns about Dana II. Finally, it had failed to 
address Dana II’s impact on collective bargaining after voluntary recognition.130 
The dissent responded that since the data reported at least 1,111 post-Dana 
II neutrality agreements (not including the ones with no posted notices), “[t]here 
has been no apparent deterrent to voluntary recognition.”131 Accordingly, the 
Board had empirical evidence that Dana II protected the employees’ preferences 
without discouraging either voluntary recognition or collective bargaining. By 
contrast, it lacked “a scintilla of objective evidence to the contrary.”132 
Finally, despite soliciting briefs on Dana II issues, and despite admitting three 
party briefs, fourteen amicus briefs, and two reply briefs that represented a variety 
of interests,133 the majority, the concurrence, and the dissent all failed to cite any 
 
126. Rite Aid Store #6473, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157, 1 (Aug. 27, 2010). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 2 n.5 (Liebman, concurring); id. at 5 (Schaumber & Hayes, dissenting). 
129. Id. at 2 n.5 (Liebman, concurring). 
130. Id. at 2 (Liebman, concurring). 
131. Id. at 5 (Schaumber & Hayes, dissenting). 
132. Id. at 5 (Schaumber & Hayes, dissenting). 
133. Invitations to File Briefs, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions 
/invitations-file-briefs (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). The amici who oppose the recognition-bar doctrine 
are (1) chambers of commerce; (2) employer industry associations; and (3) anti-union advocacy 
organizations. The amici who support the recognition-bar doctrine are (1) congressmen; (2) 
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social science statistics. Instead, they concentrated on comparing and contrasting 
the Dana II issues to past precedent, particularly the prohibition on prehiring 
agreements outside construction workplaces under Majestic Weaving Co. of New 
York.134 In doing so, Board members reasoned “like lawyers balancing rights 
rather than policy analysts studying social and economic regulatory problems.”135 
F. Critique of Card Recognition Cases 
1. Quality of Data 
Throughout the card recognition cases, the Board fell short of engaging with 
social science studies in the spirit of Daubert, which suggests that adjudicators who 
evaluate specialized evidence should interrogate its testing, peer review, error rate, 
operational standards, and general acceptance.136 Because labor conditions are 
“rapidly changing,”137 several legal scholars have updated McCulloch’s study with 
more recent material.138 However, although his speech was forty-five years old at 
the time of the Dana II decision, neither the majority nor the dissent ever raised 
issues regarding its reliability. Likewise, both opinions accepted the General 
Counsel’s statistics without addressing this issue. 
Initially, the absence of Daubert analysis might not appear unduly alarming. 
As a former NLRB chairman, McCulloch lacked incentive to falsify his findings to 
favor either party. As a federal labor office, the General Counsel had expertise on 
labor issues in general and NLRB proceedings in particular. As “several” 
submitters cited the former chairman’s speech,139 it probably enjoyed a general 
consensus of undisputed correctness. Consequently, analysts might assert that 
Board members refrained from questioning its reliability simply because reliability 
was not an issue. 
However, critics should consider the studies’ two sources: the NLRB’s 
former chairman and the NLRB’s General Counsel. Lacking internal expertise in 
social science techniques,140 the Board must rely on briefs from parties to supply 
specialized data141—and likely also to evaluate this data. Notwithstanding the 
data’s true quality, the uniquely symbiotic relationship between the NLRB’s lawyer 
 
companies; (3) unions; and (4) professors. It is worth noting that Dana III lists different amici. See 
Dana Corp. (Dana III ) , 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (2010). This is likely because they had responded to a 
March 30, 2006, request for briefs that occurred a year before Dana II. Accordingly, I analyze these 
entities under Dana II. 
134. Majestic Weaving Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964). 
135. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, at 2019.  
136. PIERCE, supra note 20, at 924. 
137. Christopher P. Yost & John H. Fanning, The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification 
Act of 1988: Advance Notice Required?, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 675, 677 (1989). 
138. See infra Part II. 
139. Dana Corp. (Dana II ) , 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 439 (2007). 
140. Gross, supra note 9, at 344–45. 
141. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, at 2065. 
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members as adjudicators, the NLRB’s General Counsel as researcher, and the 
NLRB’s General Counsel as prosecutor may encourage the members to weigh 
their opinions more heavily, letting older data from NLRB actors trump newer 
data from outside entities.142 
The Board is likeliest to encounter the issue of symbiosis when the beliefs of 
members and researchers are aligned. That is, the Board is unlikely to complete a 
rigorous Daubert analysis or conduct a resource-intensive review of specialized 
opposing arguments when the adjudicators agree with the ideological implications 
of the information’s conclusions. However, the parties and the public would 
prefer the Board to articulate its reasons for accepting or rejecting these 
arguments, especially when authors and adjudicators both serve a single agency 
and support the same outcome. 
The existence (or appearance) of undesirable incentives implicates two 
issues: reliability and legitimacy. The assumption underlying the adversarial system 
is that clashes between counterparties will expose the truth143—an assumption 
critical to adjudicators lacking the technical knowledge to evaluate the evidence 
without input from parties. If the Board develops patterns of weighing certain 
viewpoints more heavily, this may cause the quality of evidence to decline, while 
leaving the Board ill-equipped to detect the defects. 
Commentators also claim that courts mainly derive their legitimacy and 
authority from persuading the public by justifying their decisions.144 As agency 
adjudicators are expressly encouraged to admit most evidence,145 the inquiry will 
likely shift from admissibility to reliability. In this context, the absence of analysis 
regarding the reliability of social science statistics may leave the Board’s decisions 
unfounded, thus inviting an assumption of political/ideological motivations. 
2. Quantity of Data 
Although the Board members appeared to agree that McCulloch’s election 
statistics were admissible and reliable, they disagreed on whether (and how) the 
statistics were relevant to showing employee coercion by unions (or employers). In 
 
142. Indeed, several scholarly studies have detected a nexus between the identities of the 
parties and the reception of their pleadings. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 749–50 (2000) (arguing that 
courts usually cite large institutional players); S. Sidney Ulmer, Selecting Cases for Supreme Court Review: 
An Underdog Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 902, 903 (1978) (arguing that courts will cite some parties 
(“upperdogs,” including businesses as well as federal, state, and local governments and their agents) 
more frequently than others (“underdogs,” including labor unions, employees, minority group 
members, aliens, and criminals)). 
143. Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbolism in the Adversarial Process—
A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 748 
(1995). 
144. Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 990–91 (2008). 
145. Multi-Med. Convalescent & Nursing Ctr. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1977). 
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order to illuminate these issues, they might have asked: (1) Fifty years later, does 
McCulloch’s data still reflect labor realities? (2) How do employees receive 
information regarding unions? and (3) How do employees make decisions on 
whom to support? Ignoring this invitation to incorporate specialized evidence, the 
opinions cited almost no social science studies to prove substantive points. 
To explain this omission, one may assert the existence of “gaping hole[s]” in 
empirical comparisons between the pressure on employees by unions and 
employers.146 Since scientific studies often require investments of time and money, 
the demand for data might exceed its supply from independent research 
communities. Considering the NLRB’s express interest in ascertaining “the actual 
experience of employees, unions, and employers,”147 and analyzing “what 
members of the labor management community . . . have to say about this data and 
its lessons,”148 critics might contend the Board is citing the best information 
available. 
However, Dana’s admission-to-citation imbalance calls the information hole 
argument into question. In Dana II, the Board admitted four opening briefs and 
four reply briefs from parties, as well as twenty-four briefs from amici. The briefs 
cited thirty-nine different sources of social science statistics that appeared in 
academic publications or agency reports from 2000 to 2010. These current 
citations featured in three of four (seventy-five percent) of the party briefs, eleven 
of twenty-four (forty-six percent) of the amicus briefs, and one of four (twenty-
five percent) of the reply briefs—a range of zero to twelve citations per brief, and 
an average of 1.6 current citations per brief.149 Nevertheless, the Dana II decision 
utilized just three sources of social science statistics, all from within the NLRB. 
Likewise, in Dana III, the Board admitted three party briefs, fourteen amicus 
briefs, and two reply briefs. The briefs cited twenty-nine different sources of social 
science statistics that appeared in academic publications or agency reports from 
2000 to 2010. These figured in one of three (thirty-three percent) of the party 
briefs, eight of fourteen (fifty-seven percent) of the amicus briefs, and one of two 
(fifty percent) of the reply briefs—a range of zero to ten citations per brief, and 
an average of 1.8 current citations per brief.150 However, despite the Board’s 
stated interest in “the actual experience of employees, unions, and employers,”151 
Dana III used no social science statistics at all. 
To explain this absence, critics should consider the shortage of rebuttal for 
 
146. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 26, at 160. 
147. Rite Aid Store #6473, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157, 1 (Aug. 27, 2010). 
148. Id. at 3 (Liebman, concurring). 
149. Case 08-RD-001976, NAT’L LABOR REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-rd 
 -001976 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (Excel data sets that describe the briefs on file with author). 
150. Invitations to File Briefs, NAT’L LABOR REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/cases  
-decisions/invitations-file-briefs (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (Excel data sets that describe the briefs on 
file with author). 
151. Rite Aid, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 1. 
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social science statistics from party and amicus briefs. In Dana II, just five152 
current sources appeared in multiple entities’ briefs, with only three153 cited in 
briefs that took opposite sides on recognition-bar issues. In Dana III, just seven154 
appeared in multiple briefs—only two155 of them opposing. Given the overlap 
between the sources cited in the Dana II briefs and the Dana III briefs, the 
combined Dana briefing contributed only four156 different current sources that 
even potentially received an opponent’s rebuttal. This increased the difficulty of 
evaluating them critically. 
By reducing its citations to social science statistics, the Board might hope to 
prevent lay members who lack a background in social science scholarship from 
inadvertently placing authority in pseudoscience. However, this practice also 
prevents the Board from accumulating experience/expertise in analyzing this type 
of information. Further, it permits a somewhat dated study to frame the 
discussion and dominate the debate, rather than sparking a dialogue that uses the 
knowledge of the past and the present. As a result, the Board runs the risk of 
rendering data irrelevant to reaching its decisions, thus raising an inference of 
arbitrariness or incompetence. 
V. PROPOSAL 
Finally, I describe my proposal and conclusion on restoring the accuracy and 
legitimacy of the Board by incorporating scientific evidence into its adjudications. 
Because the amendment which prohibits the NLRB from employing any 
economists arguably permits the employment of general social scientists,157 some 
scholars suggest the agency should hire a social science unit to evaluate party 
 
152. These five sources were cited in the briefs: JAROL P. MANHEIM, THE DEATH OF A 
THOUSAND CUTS (2001), Charles I. Cohen, Neutrality Agreements: Will the NLRB Sanction Its Own 
Obsolescence?, LAB. LAW. (2000), Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and 
Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42 (2001), Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor 
Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369 (2001), and Memorandum from Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Gen. 
Counsel, to Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB (Dec. 5, 2003) (on file with author). 
153. These sources were cited in the briefs: Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 152, Hartley, supra 
note 151, and Arthur F. Rosenfeld, supra note 152. 
154. These sources were cited in the briefs: MANHEIM, supra note 152, Cohen, supra note 152, 
Joel Dillard & Jennifer Dillard, Fetishing The Electoral Process: The National Labor Relations Board’s 
Problematic Embrace of Electoral Formalism, 6 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 819 (2008), Eaton & Kriesky, supra 
note 150, Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, New Survey Says Union Members Prefer Secret-Ballot Elections over 
Card Check, DAILY LAB. REP., July 22, 2004, and Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The 
Intensification of Employer Organizing, ECON. POL’Y INST., Briefing Paper No. 235 (2009). 
155. These sources were cited in the briefs: Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 152, and Fisk & 
Malamud, supra note 8. 
156. These sources were cited in the briefs: Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 152, Fisk & 
Malamud, supra note 8, Hartley, supra note 152, and Arthur F. Rosenfeld, supra note 152.  
157. 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010–2011) (stating that “[n]othing in this subchapter 
shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals . . . for economic analysis”). 
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evidence and initiate independent investigations.158 However, the NLRB is 
different from similar agencies that employ economists for scientific analysis. 
Specifically, Congress’s standard criteria for qualified Board members have 
evolved to limit the ability of academics without industrial workplace experience 
to influence national policy. Second, the Board’s adjudicatory body only requires 
economic research on specific appellate issues, not general policy inquiries. Third, 
the Board receives a substantial quantity of expert evidence from amicus briefs, 
not internal sources. Accordingly, Congress should accommodate the NLRB’s 
unique needs by authorizing an economic research unit to produce scientific 
evidence and approving a cross-disciplinary Board to evaluate this evidence. 
To this end, I argue that presidents and Congress should expand the Board 
member pool to include social scientists. Originally, presidents accepted that 
career academics were uniquely qualified and inherently impartial. However, since 
the Eisenhower administration, presidents abandoned this nomination tradition in 
order to limit the ability of academics without industrial workplace experience to 
influence national policy. Despite initial protests, Congress approved these 
appointments and apparently accepted the underlying arguments. 
Specifically, when Eisenhower expanded the Board’s membership to include 
political appointees, proponents suggested that partisans possessed: (1) an 
expertise in real-world labor relations, (2) the integrity to render fair verdicts, and 
(3) the ability to follow federal judges in rejecting their old roles as private parties 
and assuming their new roles as representatives of the public interest.159 They also 
alleged the impossibility of finding “anyone . . . entirely free” from allegedly 
prejudicial experiences.160 By approving these appointments, Congress lent 
credence to the arguments in their favor. 
When Nixon nominated a career management lawyer named Edward B. 
Miller, his supporters amplified the Eisenhower-era arguments to argue that since 
private-sector experience yields practical expertise, Miller’s management 
background was not a minus, but a plus. Instead, Congress’s true concern should 
be the NLRB’s overwhelming inclusion of appointees from government and 
academia.161 Again, Congress appeared to accept these arguments by approving 
these appointments. 
The Miller nomination marked a turning point in perceived acceptability of 
partisan appointments. By reacting to antipartisan arguments with profound 
indifference (not one senator voted against it), Congress exhibited “complete 
acquiescence to the appointment of management partisans to the Labor Board.”162 
Accordingly, Congress also implicitly acknowledged the concerns over permitting 
 
158. Roomkin & Abrams, supra note 15, at 1459. 
159. Flynn, supra note 4, at 1372–74. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 1379–81.  
162. Id. at 1382–83. 
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government employees and academics who lacked industry experience to 
influence labor policy. With the exception of Carter, the succeeding presidents 
continued this practice.163 
Supporting Miller’s appointment, one Senator expressed concern that the 
Board “has had a deficiency by not having anyone on it who has had direct 
practical experience in the field.”164 This rhetoric reflects an unflattering 
assumption about academic experts. Specifically, it suggests that professional 
researchers lack the industrial workplace expertise to understand their theories’ 
actual effects. By contrast, political appointees possess the practical life experience 
to temper academics’ impact on national labor policy. This establishes an 
inherently adversarial relationship between the contributions of the academics and 
the competency of the agency. 
If Congress were to reauthorize the DER, the tension between the lawyers 
on the Board and the social scientists employed by it could undermine its ability to 
use this evidence effectively. Assuming Congress’s attempts to ensure the 
reconstituted DER’s independence by rendering it separate from the Board (much 
like the NLRB’s General Counsel), it might hamper the economic unit’s 
integration into existing Board processes by making it all too easy for members to 
ignore its evidence and analyses. 
By contrast, if Congress augments the Board’s membership with professional 
academics, they may develop a dialogue between lawyers and researchers and 
foster mutual assistance between law and science. At minimum, the Board 
members trained in social science would be able to write majority, concurring, or 
dissenting opinions assessing the Board’s evidentiary engagement, thereby forcing 
the Board members trained in law to address the specialized evidence submitted. 
Further, since current Board members serve a five-year term before rejoining 
the ranks of attorneys for corporations and unions, their labor industry roots 
could influence their ideologies (either because the interests of employability 
might affect their opinions or because their side-specific ties might indicate their 
preexisting labor philosophies). Accordingly, some argue that “because of their 
bias, neither the Board as an institution nor the public will really reap the benefit 
of the great practical expertise that union and management-side lawyers turned 
Board members bring to the job . . . [because] their partisan ties will trump their 
expertise every time.”165 
Assuming this argument has merit, the members’ partisan ties could equally 
well trump the unit’s economic research. While Congress is unlikely to find a 
perfectly impartial nominee, it may locate a professional researcher lacking a 
 
163. Id. at 1393–94. 
164. Id. at 1455 n.91 (quoting Miller testimony). 
165. Joan Flynn, “Expertness for What?”: The Gould Years at the NLRB and the Irrepressible Myth of 
the “Independent” Agency, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 478 (2000). 
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connection to unions or corporations. Further, unlike an attorney Board member, 
a scholarly Board member who evaluates technical evidence must adhere to 
scientific community standards. Accordingly, his presence may counteract the 
politicization of controversial labor questions by encouraging the NLRB to engage 
the facts.Through persuading his colleagues to engage party evidence, a scholarly 
Board member could promote the spirit of Daubert and push a thorough, rigorous 
approach to justifying technical decisions. Indeed, since the original DER existed a 
decade before Congress began approving any partisan Board members, a proposal 
to evoke the Board’s early days should encompass both elements of early NLRB 
adjudications: nonpartisan researchers and nonpartisan decisionmakers. 
Further, the NLRB’s research needs are narrow in scope. For example, since 
the Department of Labor (DOL) is charged with promulgating labor regulations, 
its Division of Economic and Labor Research offers advice regarding the 
relevance, application, and interpretation of current economic research to 
international economic policy. Further, it fills DOL requests for research results 
and economic analyses to facilitate the formulation of international economic 
policies and programs.166 By contrast, the Board’s adjudicatory body only requires 
economic research on specific issues relevant to adjudications, not general labor 
policy. 
Given the NLRB’s narrow interests, opponents of employing interagency 
economists may argue that the DER’s exploratory research is incompatible with 
the NLRB’s adjudicatory function. Without a background in law, academics might 
expand their inquiries into questions not raised by real-world litigants, who may 
prefer to leave these issues to legislatures or resolve them independently. Yet, if 
NLRB adjudicators included a mix of lawyers and scholars, the agency could 
utilize the attorneys’ unique expertise in limiting the deliberations to legally 
relevant issues. To maximize these benefits of interdisciplinarity, the NLRB 
should change its composition to include three labor lawyers and two social 
scientists. (Ideally, the Board would implement this proposal upon reaching its 
quorum of five acting members.) In setting the number of scientists at two of five, 
the NLRB could include sufficient experts to permit a debate, thus preventing one 
person from becoming the arbiter of real scientific truth. Simultaneously, it could 
maintain the Board’s lawyer majority, thus reflecting its role of adjudicating legal 
disputes. 
Finally, the Board receives a substantial quantity of scientific evidence from 
amicus briefs. However, while staffed exclusively by lawyers, the Board is ill-
prepared to evaluate the quality of amicus evidence.167 Consequently, “the only 
kind of expertise [the Board] possesses [is] the logical coherence of doctrine and 
 
166. Division of Economic and Labor Research (ELR), DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov 
/ilab/programs/otla/economic.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
167. Gross, supra note 9, at 346–47. 
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an intuitive sense about whether particular rules generate productive or 
unproductive litigation.”168 This “type of expertise . . . is quite different from what 
generally counts as administrative agency expertise,” that is, expertise in the 
subject of the adjudication.169 
Considering these characteristics of modern Board members, a social science 
staff could enhance the NLRB by filling the expert evaluator void. If Congress did 
nothing other than reauthorize the DER, it would create the problem of a single 
party serving as both a source and an evaluator, and give this party an advantage 
over external sources, only partially addressing the agency’s structural issues. By 
contrast, if Congress also expanded the Board to include social scientists, it would 
ensure that separate groups generate and evaluate specialized evidence. 
On the one hand, a dominant interagency DER might reap the benefits of 
economies of scale, allowing its economists to afford larger, more expensive 
research. On the other, it may reduce competition for Board citations, thus 
undermining accountability and encouraging complacency. By separating the 
generators and evaluators of information, the NLRB could establish an incentive 
for employees and amici to submit their very best research, thus increasing the 
agency’s scientific relevance and improving its impartiality and legitimacy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In defending agencies’ exemption from strict FRE standards for evaluating 
expert evidence, scholars suggest that agency ALJs have: (1) extensive experience 
and specialized expertise in specific subjects, and (2) political accountability for 
policy choices regarding certain industries. Although the current NLRB lacks a 
staff of social science experts, the Board still requires specialized expertise to 
formulate labor policies that address real-world problems.170 To bridge this gap, 
the Dana Boards admitted numerous briefs with social science statistics, but cited 
very few of them. The pool of perspectives necessarily impacted the Board’s data 
quality and quantity, and thus its deliberations and decisions. 
Scholars have faulted the NLRB for its ignorance about the impact of its 
decisions, its isolation from the policymaking in other areas of the law of the 
workplace (including the policymaking of the Department of Labor and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission), and “the tendency of Board members, 
who recently have been drawn almost entirely from the ranks of labor and 
management attorneys, to reason like lawyers balancing rights rather than policy 
analysts studying social and economic regulatory problems.”171 Although many 
agree the NLRB’s recent approach to evaluating scientific evidence is less than 
 
168. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, at 2066. 
169. Id. 
170. Stryker, supra note 5, at 344. 
171. Fisk & Malamud, supra note 8, at 2019.  
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perfect, they disagree on what the problems are—and how to fix them. 
Accordingly, some state the NLRB should minimize its use of social science 
to honor Congress’s intent in excluding economist employees while upholding 
superior interests, such as legal realism and stare decisis. Others suggest the NLRB 
should maximize its use of social science beyond simply employing social 
scientists. Finally, some argue the NLRB should expand its role to encompass 
both adjudication and rulemaking, thereby reducing its dependence on amicus 
briefs altogether. 
To support the role of science, I argue that bringing experts aboard will 
enrich the analysis by offering an alternative to reasoning like lawyers. However, 
assuming the NLRB then becomes more qualified to analyze specialized evidence, 
it does not need to give this evidence dispositive weight. If the expert analysis 
clashes with popular labor policy or existing market reality (for example, the 
interest in maintaining stable rules), the Board could exercise its discretion to 
minimize its impact. 
To support the limits on economic experts, I argue the NLRB is entrusted 
with balancing competing interests. Accordingly, the Board should create a culture 
that incorporates specialized evidence without marginalizing alternative outlooks, 
such as law and politics. By developing a reputation for justifying its decisions in 
rational, empirical terms, the Board will increase its relevance and pave the way for 
expanding into new policymaking avenues—perhaps even rulemaking. 
When proposing novel solutions to pervasive social problems, some scholars 
suggest that since the smaller government entities are more abundant, more 
adaptable, and less likely to radically affect a large constituency, such “laboratories 
of democracy”172 serve as ideal test subjects. Thus, investigating a proposal for 
improving the NLRB’s evidentiary policy could inspire a more universal debate 
about whether amicus briefs are sufficient for courts to fill the social science gap 
without sacrificing relevance and reliability. Ultimately, exploring these issues 











172. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (explaining the argument for 
states as laboratories of democracy). 
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